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Abstract	  	  While	  introspective	  methods	  went	  out	  of	  favour	  with	  the	  decline	  of	  Titchener’s	  analytic	  school,	  many	  important	  questions	  concern	  the	  rehabilitation	  of	  introspection	  in	  contemporary	  psychology.	  Hatfield	  (2005)	  rightly	  points	  out	  that	  introspective	  methods	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  analytic	  ones,	  and	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  their	  “ineliminable	  role”	  in	  perceptual	  psychology.	  Here	  I	  argue	  that	  certain	  methodological	  conventions	  within	  psychophysics	  reflect	  a	  continued	  uncertainty	  over	  appropriate	  use	  of	  subjects’	  perceptual	  observations	  and	  the	  reliability	  of	  their	  introspective	  judgements.	  	   My	  first	  claim	  is	  that	  different	  psychophysical	  methods	  do	  not	  rely	  equally	  on	  the	  introspective	  capabilities	  of	  experimental	  subjects.	  I	  contrast	  “minimally-­‐introspective”	  tasks	  with	  “introspection-­‐heavy”	  ones.	  It	  is	  only	  in	  the	  latter,	  I	  argue,	  that	  introspection	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  role	  in	  the	  subjects’	  performance.	  My	  second	  claim	  is	  that	  my	  rough-­‐and-­‐ready	  distinction	  maps	  onto	  a	  number	  of	  important	  “dichotomies”	  in	  vision	  science	  (Kingdom	  and	  Prins	  2009).	  Not	  coincidentally,	  the	  introspection-­‐heavy	  categorisation	  captures	  many	  of	  the	  tasks	  typically	  considered	  less	  able	  to	  yield	  useful	  information	  regarding	  the	  processes	  underlying	  visual	  sensation.	  	  	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  	  Recent	  work	  on	  introspection	  in	  psychology	  has	  been	  careful	  to	  separate	  the	  specific	  commitments	  of	  Titchener’s	  analytical	  school	  from	  the	  discussion	  of	  introspection	  more	  generally.	  For	  example,	  Hatfield	  (2005)	  defines	  introspection	  broadly	  as,	  “a	  mental	  state	  or	  activity	  in	  or	  through	  which	  persons	  are	  aware	  of	  properties	  or	  aspects	  of	  their	  own	  conscious	  experience”	  (p.260).	  He	  later	  defines	  introspection	  as,	  “deliberate	  and	  immediate	  attention	  to	  certain	  aspects	  of	  phenomenal	  experience,”	  arguing	  that,	  “it	  continues	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  source	  of	  evidence	  in	  perceptual	  and	  cognitive	  psychology”	  (p.279).	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  challenge	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  Hatfield’s	  definitions	  in	  the	  branch	  of	  perceptual	  psychology	  known	  as	  psychophysics1,	  offering	  an	  alternative	  account.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Psychophysics	  is	  defined	  by	  Gescheider	  (1997)	  as	  “the	  scientific	  study	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  stimulus	  and	  sensation.”	  The	  disciplinary	  demarcation	  between	  psychophysics	  and	  perceptual	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A	  Metameric	  Match	  Experiment.	  The	  subject	  is	  asked	  to	  adjust	  the	  intensities	  of	  R,	  G	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Schwitzgebel’s	  (2011)	  sceptical	  case	  against	  introspection	  does	  not	  target	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  have	  conscious	  states,	  or	  that	  those	  states	  are	  important	  to	  our	  mental	  economy,	  but	  is	  concerned	  to	  argue	  that	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  than	  we	  care	  to	  admit	  the	  contents	  of	  those	  states	  are	  indeterminate	  or	  unknown	  to	  us.	  My	  interpretation	  of	  Hatfield’s	  notion	  of	  introspection	  will	  hinge	  on	  this	  point.	  I	  understand	  his	  claim	  that	  contemporary	  perceptual	  psychology	  relies	  on	  introspective	  evidence	  to	  be	  the	  claim	  that	  psychologists	  exploit	  their	  subjects’	  introspective	  ability	  in	  order	  to	  glean	  information	  about	  the	  human	  perceptual	  system,	  and	  furthermore	  it	  is	  a	  presupposition	  of	  this	  experimental	  practice	  that	  subjects	  are	  competent	  introspectors	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  giving	  verbal	  or	  motor	  responses	  which	  reliably	  indicate	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  particular	  features	  of	  their	  conscious	  experiences.	  For	  example,	  a	  psychophysical	  experiment	  which	  measures	  the	  absolute	  detection	  threshold	  for	  a	  dim	  spot	  of	  light	  is	  said	  to	  be	  reliant	  on	  the	  subject’s	  capacity	  to	  introspect	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  her	  subjective	  awareness	  of	  the	  spot	  is	  a	  crucial	  data	  point	  that	  the	  experimenter	  has	  access	  to	  because	  of	  the	  subject’s	  capacity	  to	  introspect.	  	  And	  thus	  the	  experimenter	  must	  assume	  that	  the	  subject	  can	  faithfully	  indicate	  those	  times	  that	  the	  spot	  enters	  her	  conscious	  field	  of	  view.	  	  	  Yet	  a	  problem	  with	  this	  account	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  it	  can	  be	  employed	  to	  distinguish	  introspection	  from	  ordinary	  perception,	  for	  doesn’t	  the	  subject’s	  activity	  in	  the	  detection	  task	  just	  boil	  down	  to	  her	  looking	  for	  a	  dim	  spot	  of	  light?	  This	  worry	  could	  prompt	  us	  to	  take	  Hatfield	  as	  endorsing	  a	  more	  restrictive	  definition.	  For	  Hatfield	  also	  suggests	  that	  what	  characterises	  introspection	  over	  ordinary	  perception	  is	  that	  one	  attends	  to	  one’s	  experience	  of	  an	  object,	  not	  just	  the	  object	  itself	  (p.	  279,	  “immediate	  attention	  to…	  phenomenal	  experience”).	  This	  makes	  introspection	  importantly	  different	  from	  perception	  because	  as	  many	  would	  have	  it,	  perception	  is	  generally	  “transparent”	  and	  our	  perceptual	  encounter	  with	  the	  world	  is	  not	  interrupted	  with	  moments	  of	  attention	  to	  experience	  itself.	  The	  difficulty	  with	  this	  reading	  is	  that	  it	  then	  becomes	  unclear	  how	  the	  more	  restrictive	  definition	  of	  introspection	  could	  apply	  to	  many	  of	  the	  psychophysical	  tasks	  that	  Hatfield	  wants	  it	  to	  apply	  to,	  such	  as	  stimulus	  detection	  and	  the	  metameric	  matching	  experiment.	  Subjects	  perform	  such	  tasks	  by	  directing	  their	  attention	  to	  external	  stimuli,	  namely	  the	  coloured	  lights,	  and	  need	  not	  attend	  to	  their	  own	  phenomenal	  experience,	  qua	  experience.	  Nor	  do	  they	  need	  to	  consider	  their	  experience	  in	  a	  more	  fine	  grained	  or	  detailed	  way	  than	  in	  ordinary	  perception.	  	  	  In	  short	  ,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  while	  Hatfield’s	  restrictive	  definition	  has	  the	  virtue	  allowing	  one	  to	  demarcate	  introspection	  from	  perception,	  it	  cannot	  reasonably	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  range	  of	  psychophysical	  tasks	  that	  Hatfield	  claims	  it	  does.	  And	  furthermore	  a	  case	  could	  be	  made	  that	  it	  should	  not	  apply	  to	  any	  perceptual	  experiment,	  since	  these	  generally	  involve	  attention	  to	  external	  objects,	  not	  attention	  to	  phenomenal	  experience	  itself.	  Yet	  the	  more	  liberal	  definition	  makes	  all	  perceptual	  activity	  concurrently	  introspective	  in	  a	  somewhat	  trivial	  sense.	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It	  strikes	  me	  that	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  defining	  introspection	  -­‐-­‐	  in	  the	  context	  of	  psychophysics	  -­‐-­‐	  is	  needed,	  one	  that	  does	  not	  characterise	  introspection	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  object	  of	  attention	  or	  focus	  of	  awareness.	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  propose	  that	  the	  tasks	  that	  should	  be	  said	  to	  involve	  introspection	  are	  the	  ones	  which	  rely	  on	  experimental	  
subjects’	  capacity	  to	  analyse	  and	  compare	  sensory	  experiences	  that	  bear	  non-­‐obvious	  
relationships	  of	  similarity	  and	  difference	  to	  each	  other.	  Thus	  on	  my	  account	  introspection	  can	  be	  part	  of	  the	  process	  of	  perceiving	  and	  attending	  to	  an	  external	  object,	  and	  need	  not	  be	  overtly	  directed	  at	  phenomenal	  experience.	  The	  subject	  may	  interpret	  her	  task	  to	  be	  simply	  that	  of	  attending	  to	  the	  external	  stimulus,	  but	  she	  can	  be	  reporting	  on	  aspects	  of	  her	  phenomenal	  experience	  nonetheless.	  	  It	  is	  also	  a	  feature	  of	  my	  view	  that	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  tasks	  rely	  on	  introspection	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  degree.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  give	  a	  set	  of	  examples	  of	  common	  psychophysical	  tasks	  that	  are	  either	  “introspection-­‐heavy”	  or	  “minimally-­‐introspective”.	  In	  the	  third	  section	  I	  describe	  how	  the	  cluster	  of	  introspection-­‐heavy	  tasks	  –	  though	  not	  described	  in	  this	  way	  by	  scientists	  themselves	  –	  has	  commonly	  attracted	  suspicion	  from	  psychophysicists	  as	  being	  less	  likely	  to	  produce	  data	  that	  is	  “objective”	  and	  informative	  about	  neural	  mechanisms.	  I	  ask	  whether	  this	  is	  mere	  coincidence,	  or	  if	  the	  methodological	  norms	  of	  psychophysics	  reflect	  a	  certain	  wariness	  towards	  introspection.	  	  	  	  
2.	  Introspection	  in	  Psychophysics	  as	  Controlled	  Comparison	  	  	  
2.1	  Examples	  Of	  Introspectively	  Demanding	  and	  Undemanding	  Psychophysical	  
Tasks.	  	  	  The	  metameric	  match	  paradigm,	  illustrated	  in	  figure	  1	  has	  been	  used	  to	  diagnose	  specific	  types	  of	  colour	  vision	  deficiency	  since	  the	  late	  19th	  century.	  Differences	  in	  the	  number	  of	  retinal	  cone	  types	  an	  individual	  has,	  and	  the	  spectral	  sensitivities	  of	  those	  cone	  classes,	  lead	  to	  measurable	  differences	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  red	  to	  green	  in	  a	  composite	  light	  that	  he	  or	  she	  judges	  to	  look	  identical	  to	  a	  yellow	  monochromatic	  standard.	  Note	  that	  in	  this	  task	  the	  only	  perceptual	  judgment	  that	  the	  subject	  need	  make	  is	  over	  whether	  the	  composite	  and	  monochromatic	  light	  are	  visually	  indistinguishable.	  If	  the	  lights	  are	  presented	  as	  abutting	  (as	  in	  fig.	  1)	  then	  the	  subject	  simply	  has	  to	  judge	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  colour	  field	  is	  homogeneous.	  No	  attention	  to	  the	  specific	  qualities	  of	  the	  perceived	  colour	  is	  required.	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Figure	  2	  
An	  Asymmetric	  Match	  Experiment.	  The	  subject	  is	  asked	  to	  adjust	  the	  proportions	  of	  R	  
and	  G	  monochromatic	  lights	  so	  that	  the	  yellows	  match	  in	  hue.	  The	  intensity	  of	  the	  Y	  
light	  is	  fixed,	  so	  the	  yellows	  cannot	  be	  matched	  for	  brightness	  and	  are	  therefore	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scene	  under	  two	  different	  lighting	  conditions.	  She	  is	  instructed	  to	  adjust	  the	  colour	  of	  the	  central	  patch	  in	  one	  image	  until	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  made	  from	  the	  same	  paper	  as	  the	  central	  patch	  in	  the	  other	  (Foster,	  2011).	  Importantly,	  even	  when	  the	  patches	  are	  matched	  there	  will	  still	  be	  a	  visible	  difference	  in	  colour	  between	  them,	  and	  the	  experiment	  relies	  on	  the	  subject	  having	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	  what	  sameness	  of	  material	  would	  look	  like	  in	  spite	  of	  these	  differences.	  Again,	  the	  task	  is	  “introspection-­‐heavy”	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  task	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  just	  has	  to	  report	  on	  the	  absolute	  identity	  or	  distinguishability	  of	  two	  stimuli.	  In	  particular,	  it	  relies	  on	  the	  subject’s	  ability	  to	  make	  a	  “judgment	  call”	  on	  the	  one	  best	  match,	  given	  a	  range	  of	  close	  contenders	  which	  vary	  along	  a	  number	  of	  different	  dimensions.	  I	  describe	  the	  introspection-­‐heavy	  tasks	  as	  requiring	  controlled	  comparison	  because	  the	  demand	  placed	  on	  the	  subject	  is	  to	  perform	  some	  kind	  of	  analysis	  and	  comparison,	  but	  within	  parameters	  that	  are	  pre-­‐specified	  by	  the	  experimenter.	  	  	  
	  	  
Figure	  3	  (a)	  Achromatic	  asymmetric	  match	  experiment	  where	  black	  annulus	  influences	  
perceived	  brightness	  of	  one	  of	  the	  circles.	  Subject	  is	  asked	  to	  determine	  point	  of	  
subjective	  equality	  of	  the	  brightness	  of	  the	  two	  circles.	  (b)	  Asymmetric	  colour	  constancy	  experiment.	  Subject	  is	  asked	  to	  adjust	  the	  colour	  of	  
one	  of	  the	  patches	  (marked	  with	  arrow)	  until	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  it	  is	  made	  from	  the	  same	  




and Judd (1940, Section III, 2(c)) to be due to indeterminacy either
generally in observer attitude or specifically in assigning chromatic
effects to an appropriate physical origin. With a properly differen-
tiated criterion for matching, therefore, fewer extreme values
should occur. A direct comparison of asymmetric color matching
with undifferentiated and differentiated criteria appears not to
have been reported. There is evidence that with a paper-match cri-
terion subjects’ responses are at least close to being normally dis-
tributed, with little evidence of outliers. In an experiment on
simultaneous asymmetric color matching with a paper-match cri-
terion (Foster, Amano, & Nascimento, 2001), the distribution of
constancy indices from 20 subjects (Section 4.1) was found to have
a standard deviation of 0.14 about a mean of 0.66. No subject
scored less than 2 s.d. below the mean.10
Implicit in Arend and Reeves’ (1986) experimental procedure
was the a sumption that their two kinds of judgments were based
on two 3-dimensional spaces: one concerned with hue, saturation,
and brightness, the other with surface color per se. Brainard t al.,
(1997) have also proposed that in asymmetric color matching with
an und ffere tiated color-match criterion, more than three dimen-
sions are involved in subjects’ judgments. The question of the num-
ber of dimensions underlying c lor judgments with surfaces under
variegated illumination was addressed directly by Tokunaga and
Logvinenko (2010) in a multidimensional scaling experiment. Sub-
jects were asked to judge the dissimilarity of surfaces in a scene
with multiple illuminants. Their responses were best modeled
with three dimensions associated with surfaces and another three
with the illuminants, but with just one illuminant, responses could
be modeled with the usual three dimensions.
3.2. Relational color constancy
As shown later (Sections 4.2 and 4.5), many experiments aimed
at measuring color constancy have actually measured a different
phenomenon, namely, relational color constancy. This refers to
the constancy of the perceived relations between the colors of sur-
faces under illuminant changes, rather than of the perceived colors
themselves11 (Foster & Nascimento, 1994; Nascimento & Foster,
1997). For example, in Fig. 3, the scene is illuminated by different
daylights, with correlated color temperatures (a) 17,000 K, (b)
4000 K, (c) 6500 K, and (d) 4000 K. The color of the light reflected
from the sphere in the bottom left corner in a–c is clearly different.
Nevertheless, given the limits of the color reproduction of these
images on the printed page, it can be seen that the sphere has the
same or similar surface color in each image by comparing it with
the nearby foliage and by looking over each image as a whole. By
contrast, in d, although the color of the light reflected from the
sphere is the same as in a, it can be seen that the sphere has a differ-
ent surface color, now more bluish, again by comparing it with near-
by foliage or over the image as a whole. In a–c, the perceived
relations between the colors are largely preserved, and in d, they
are not.
Relational color constancy has been given an operational mean-
ing, independent of its subjectiv content, namely, the ability of an
observer to correctly attribute changes in the color appearance of a
c ne either to changes in the spectral composition of the illumi-
nant or to changes in the reflecting properties of that scene, i.e.
its mat rials (Craven & Foster, 1992; Foster, Craven, & Sale,
1992). A similar issue has been emphasized by Zaidi (1998). The
formal equivalence of perceptual and operational interpretations
of relational color constancy was set out by Foster and Nascimento
(1994, Appendix 1), and its experimental application is described
here in Section 4.5.
The phenomenology of illuminant and material changes has
been found to be particularly compelling when the changes occur
as a temporal sequence without an intervening delay. Thus, when
subjects were presented with successive Mondrian patterns re-
lated by illuminant or material changes (Craven & Foster, 1992),
they reported that the ‘‘changes of illuminant tended to be per-
ceived as a coloured wash over the display, whereas changes of
material led to a distinctively uneven appearance’’ (p. 1364).
As Fig. 3 illustrates, reliable discriminations can also be made
between simultaneously presented images related by an illumi-
nant change, as in a and b, and by an additional material change,
as in a and d. This ability persists with presentations las-
ting < 200 ms and led to the suggestion that the ability to judge
whether color relations were preserved or violated was the result
of fast, relatively low-level, spatially parallel visual processing
(Foster et al., 1992). This notion was supported by subsequent
measurements in which during successive illuminant changes,
material changes in one or more surfaces in an array of other sur-
faces were shown to be readily detected almost independently of
the numbers of surfaces (Foster, Nascimento, et al., 2001). One
Fig. 5. Mondrian patterns used by Arend and Reeves (1986) in simultaneous asymmetric color matching. The patterns consisted of Munsell matte colored papers of Munsell
Value 5 simulated under daylight and sunlight with correlated color temperatures 6500 K on the left and 4000 K on the right. Patch luminances were varied by ±10%. The
variable ‘‘match’’ patch arrowed in the right pattern was matched against the corresponding test patch arrowed in the left pattern (arrows absent in the original). Recreated
from Fig. 1 of Arend and Reeves (1986, pp. 1744–1745).
10 The kurtosis of the sample, a measure of the potential of the distribution for
outliers, was in fact less than that for a normal distribution.
11 The perceived relations between the colors of surfaces should not be confused
with what defines related colors, such as brown and olive, which require the presence
of other colors, achromatic or chromatic, to be perceived. The former refers to pairs
(or larger groupings) of arbitrary colors; the latter to particular individual colors.
680 D.H. Foster / Vision Research 51 (2011) 674–700
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4a).	  In	  one	  of	  these	  publications,	  Tolhurst	  and	  colleagues	  (2010)	  also	  present	  results	  of	  a	  simple	  two-­‐alternative-­‐forced-­‐choice	  (2-­‐AFC)	  contrast	  discrimination	  experiment	  in	  which	  subjects	  just	  had	  to	  report	  which	  of	  a	  pair	  of	  otherwise	  identical	  photographs	  contained	  a	  small,	  high	  contrast	  central	  patch	  (see	  fig.	  4b).	  They	  then	  apply	  their	  model	  of	  contrast	  discrimination	  to	  the	  rating	  scale	  data.	  The	  rating	  scale	  task	  falls	  under	  my	  introspection-­‐heavy	  category,	  while	  the	  contrast	  discrimination	  task	  is	  minimally-­‐introspective.	  In	  the	  former,	  the	  subject	  must	  make	  a	  judgement	  as	  to	  the	  relative	  similarity	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  pairs	  of	  stimuli,	  that	  differ	  in	  different	  ways,	  whereas	  in	  the	  latter	  task	  she	  detects	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  a	  high-­‐contrast	  patch	  in	  a	  rather	  automatic	  fashion.	  Figure	  4	  illustrates	  how	  similar	  stimuli	  can	  be	  used	  in	  these	  two	  very	  different	  experiments,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  complexity	  of	  stimulus	  per	  se	  that	  determines	  how	  introspectively	  demanding	  the	  task	  is.	  Rather,	  the	  determining	  factor	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  response	  that	  the	  subject	  must	  make	  to	  the	  stimulus.	  That	  is,	  whether	  the	  response	  is	  simply	  choice	  between	  saying	  the	  high	  contrast	  patch	  appeared	  first	  or	  second	  out	  of	  two	  stimuli,	  or	  if	  it	  calls	  for	  a	  more	  careful	  examination	  of	  the	  perceived	  properties	  of	  the	  stimuli.	  	  	  
	  	  
Figure	  4	  
Example	  of	  stimuli	  used	  by	  Tolhurst	  et	  al.	  2010	  (a)	  Rating	  scale	  task.	  For	  each	  of	  294	  
image	  pairs,	  subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  how	  similar	  or	  different	  they	  appeared	  on	  a	  
numerical	  scale	  of	  their	  own	  devising.	  (permission	  needed)	  
354 D. J. Tolhurst et al. / Seeing and Perceiving 23 (2010) 349–372
Figure 1. Monochrome representations of some of the kinds of image pair used in our experiments.
(A) and (B) from the ‘garden scene’ series. The left-hand images show two of the parent images
in the experiments, while the middle and right-hand images show variant images against which the
parents could be compared. There were 48 variants of each. (A) Shows two variants that differ in the
magnitude of a single change type, while (B) shows variants that differ in 2 different ways. (C–E) From
the ‘varied pairs’ series; the upper stimulus is the parent, and the lower image is one of 5 variants in the
experiments. (C) Shows a colour change; (D) shows a shape change; (E) shows an item disappearing.
The ‘colour change’ was achieved by changing the hue and the saturation of one banana, using code
written in Matlab (The Mathworks). ‘Shape’ and ‘appearance’ changes used time-lapse photography.
For details and coloured examples, see To et al. (2008, 2010).
!"#$
!%#$
Draft.	  Please	  do	  not	  quote	  without	  permission.	  Comments	  welcome.	  
	   8	  
(b)	  2-­‐AFC	  contrast	  discrimination.	  Subjects	  had	  to	  report	  if	  the	  high	  contrast	  central	  
patch	  appeared	  in	  the	  first	  or	  second	  stimulus.	  	  	  Before	  moving	  on,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  emphasise	  that	  my	  two	  categories	  are	  intended	  to	  reflect	  a	  qualitative	  difference	  in	  how	  introspectively	  demanding	  these	  tasks	  are,	  and	  that	  I	  will	  say	  nothing	  in	  this	  paper	  about	  how	  to	  quantify	  this	  difference,	  and	  how	  it	  is	  that	  introspective	  demands	  admit	  of	  degree.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  metameric	  matching	  is	  even	  less	  introspectively	  demanding	  than	  contrast	  discrimination	  will	  be	  left	  unanswered.	  It	  seems	  plausible	  that	  introspective	  demands,	  like	  attentional	  demands,	  come	  in	  degrees	  but	  I	  offer	  no	  suggestions	  of	  how	  one	  might	  measure	  this.	  It	  is	  also	  plausible	  that	  there	  will	  be	  some	  tasks	  that	  occupy	  middle	  ground	  between	  my	  categories	  and	  are	  hard	  to	  classify	  either	  way.	  I	  will	  not	  deal	  with	  such	  cases	  here.	  My	  aim	  in	  presenting	  a	  set	  of	  tasks	  that	  are	  intuitively	  more	  reliant	  on	  introspection	  than	  the	  others	  has	  been	  to	  highlight	  one	  way	  that	  introspection	  may	  be	  said	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  perceptual	  psychology,	  and	  to	  this	  end	  I	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  most	  clear	  cut	  cases.	  	  	  
2.2	  Other	  Classifications	  of	  Psychophysical	  Tasks	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  attractive	  things	  about	  psychophysics	  as	  a	  subject	  for	  philosophy	  of	  science	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  throughout	  its	  short	  history	  methodological	  questions	  about	  the	  best	  way	  to	  measure	  sensory	  responses	  have	  been	  debated	  in	  a	  perspicacious	  way	  by	  leading	  protagonists.	  Moreover,	  such	  controversies	  still	  resonate	  in	  the	  living	  memory	  of	  the	  discipline,	  and	  are	  recounted	  even	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  textbooks.	  One	  way	  in	  which	  methodological	  debates	  commonly	  unfold	  is	  with	  a	  distinction	  first	  being	  drawn	  between	  two	  broad	  classes	  of	  psychophysical	  techniques,	  and	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	  the	  two	  classes	  are	  subsequently	  discussed.	  	  	  In	  their	  textbook	  Kingdom	  and	  Prins	  (2009)	  devote	  a	  chapter	  to	  the	  “dichotomies”	  that	  have	  been	  most	  significant	  to	  psychophysicists	  past	  and	  present.	  The	  first	  of	  these,	  Brindley’s	  (1960,	  1970)	  distinction	  between	  Class	  A	  and	  Class	  B	  observations	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  my	  account	  of	  introspection.	  Brindley	  characterised	  Class	  A	  observations	  as	  any	  tasks	  in	  which	  the	  observer	  just	  had	  to	  report	  on	  the	  absolute	  similarity	  or	  dissimilarity	  in	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  pair	  of	  stimuli.	  For	  example,	  the	  measurement	  of	  the	  detection	  threshold	  for	  a	  spot	  of	  light	  is	  Class	  A	  because	  the	  subject	  need	  only	  indicate	  whether	  the	  trial	  in	  which	  the	  spot	  is	  present	  is	  distinguishable	  or	  not	  from	  the	  reference	  stimulus	  in	  which	  the	  spot	  is	  absent.	  Likewise,	  the	  measurement	  of	  the	  discrimination	  threshold	  for	  the	  brightness	  of	  the	  spot	  is	  also	  Class	  A,	  as	  it	  just	  requires	  the	  subject	  to	  report	  if	  the	  trial	  in	  which	  the	  luminosity	  of	  the	  spot	  is	  increased	  looks	  different	  from	  the	  trial	  in	  which	  the	  luminosity	  remained	  at	  baseline.	  In	  contrast,	  Brindley	  (1970:133)	  categorised	  as	  Class	  B,	  “[a]ny	  observation	  that	  cannot	  be	  expressed	  as	  the	  identity	  or	  non-­‐identity	  of	  two	  sensations…”;	  for	  example,	  “all	  those	  [observations]	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  must	  describe	  the	  quality	  or	  intensity	  of	  his	  sensations,	  or	  abstract	  from	  two	  different	  sensations	  some	  aspect	  in	  which	  they	  are	  alike.”	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Brindley’s	  description	  of	  Class	  B	  observations	  is	  interchangeable	  with	  my	  characterisation	  of	  introspection-­‐heavy	  tasks.	  Indeed,	  the	  tasks	  which	  I	  presented	  as	  examples	  of	  my	  minimally-­‐introspective	  category	  –	  metameric	  matching	  and	  contrast	  discrimination	  –	  are	  Class	  A,	  whereas	  all	  kinds	  of	  asymmetric	  matching	  and	  rating	  scale	  tasks	  are	  Class	  B.	  In	  essence,	  both	  of	  these	  categorisation	  schemes	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  drawing	  a	  distinction	  between	  tasks	  in	  which	  the	  experimental	  subject	  is	  treated	  somewhat	  like	  a	  thoughtless	  measuring	  instrument,	  and	  methods	  that	  rely	  on	  the	  subject’s	  status	  as	  a	  critical	  being	  who	  can	  attend	  to	  and	  reflect	  on	  her	  own	  conscious	  states.	  The	  point	  is	  not	  that	  the	  A/minimally-­‐introspective	  Class	  treats	  the	  subject	  as	  if	  unconscious,	  or	  that	  it	  requires	  the	  subject	  to	  have	  sensory	  capacities	  but	  not	  cognitive	  ones.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  that	  the	  A/minimally-­‐introspective	  Class	  makes	  no	  demands	  on	  any	  capacity	  for	  reflection	  on	  and	  comparison	  of	  occurrent	  sensory	  states,	  whereas	  tasks	  in	  the	  B/introspection-­‐heavy	  Class	  do4.	  	  	  To	  illustrate	  this,	  imagine	  a	  machine	  that	  can	  read	  off	  the	  conscious	  sensory	  states	  of	  a	  subject	  performing	  a	  contrast	  discrimination	  task.	  In	  order	  to	  predict	  the	  subject’s	  responses	  to	  any	  trial,	  all	  the	  machine	  must	  do	  is	  to	  assign	  a	  number	  to	  the	  intensities	  of	  the	  subject’s	  experience	  of	  contrast	  for	  the	  central	  regions	  of	  the	  two	  different	  stimuli.	  If	  they	  have	  the	  same	  values	  the	  machine	  predicts	  the	  answer	  is	  ‘same’,	  and	  if	  they	  differ	  the	  machine	  predicts	  an	  answer	  of	  ‘different’.	  Once	  the	  non-­‐trivial	  problem	  of	  reading	  off	  individuals’	  phenomenal	  states	  is	  solved,	  the	  rest	  is	  uncomplicated!	  If	  an	  equivalent	  machine	  were	  to	  be	  built	  for	  the	  rating	  scale	  task,	  the	  blueprint	  could	  not	  be	  so	  simple.	  There	  is	  no	  one	  quality	  of	  the	  subject’s	  conscious	  experience	  of	  the	  stimuli	  that	  the	  machine	  could	  measure	  and	  use	  to	  predict	  the	  response.	  Rather,	  the	  machine	  would	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  some	  complicated	  model	  of	  how	  various	  differences	  in	  the	  experienced	  qualities	  of	  the	  images	  are	  weighted	  against	  each	  other	  to	  give	  and	  impression	  of	  greater	  or	  lesser	  degrees	  of	  similarity5.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  model	  of	  introspective	  comparison	  and	  not	  a	  simple	  measurement	  algorithm.	  	  	  The	  mind-­‐reading	  machine	  thought	  experiment	  again	  confronts	  us	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  distinction	  being	  drawn	  is	  not	  between	  tasks	  that	  are	  in	  no	  way	  introspective	  and	  those	  that	  completely	  are.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  tasks	  call	  upon	  some	  putative	  introspective	  capacity.	  For	  the	  first	  machine,	  dealing	  with	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In	  support	  of	  this	  idea	  that	  the	  key	  distinction	  in	  play	  here	  is	  between	  subject-­‐as-­‐measuring-­‐instrument	  and	  subject-­‐as-­‐reflective-­‐being,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Brindley’s	  one	  example	  of	  a	  psychophysical	  document	  explicitly	  hostile	  to	  Class	  B	  observations	  is	  the	  1943	  Optical	  Society	  of	  America	  (OSA)	  report	  that,	  as	  Stevens	  (1951:31)	  relates,	  “reduces	  psychophysics	  to	  the	  employment	  of	  a	  human	  observer	  as	  a	  null	  instrument	  under	  a	  set	  of	  strictly	  specified	  conditions”	  And	  Brindley’s	  one	  example	  of	  a	  psychophysicist	  liberal	  with	  regards	  to	  Class	  B	  is	  Stevens	  (1951),	  who	  explicitly	  rejects	  the	  OSA	  definition	  as	  too	  narrow	  and	  restrictive	  (and	  cf.	  Helson	  1949).	  5	  Interestingly,	  however,	  Tolhurst	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  can	  predict	  trends	  in	  the	  similarity	  rating	  data	  to	  a	  fair	  degree	  of	  accuracy	  with	  a	  model	  of	  entirely	  unconscious	  neuronal	  response	  functions.	  The	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  “machine”	  that	  can	  predict	  responses	  to	  the	  contrast	  discrimination	  and	  rating	  scale	  experiments,	  without	  peering	  into	  the	  conscious	  states	  of	  subjects	  should	  not	  detract	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  any	  hypothetical	  machine	  attempting	  to	  examine	  conscious	  states	  in	  order	  to	  predict	  responses	  would	  have	  a	  to	  treat	  the	  two	  experiments	  differently.	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contrast	  discrimination	  experiment,	  can	  still	  peer	  into	  the	  conscious	  states	  of	  observers	  and	  this	  captures	  some	  minimal	  notion	  of	  introspective	  activity.	  Yet	  the	  second	  machine,	  dealing	  with	  the	  rating	  scale	  experiment,	  needs	  not	  only	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  subject	  experiences,	  but	  also	  to	  determine	  what	  the	  subject	  makes	  of	  her	  experience,	  what	  is	  more	  and	  less	  salient	  about	  the	  different	  qualities	  presented	  in	  her	  visual	  phenomenology.	  This	  is	  an	  introspective	  undertaking	  of	  a	  weightier	  kind.	  	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  say	  how	  influential	  Brindley’s	  distinction	  has	  been.	  It	  came	  under	  immediate	  criticism	  from	  Boynton	  and	  Onley	  (1962)	  but	  was	  clearly	  accepted	  in	  some	  form	  by	  Marks	  (1978)	  and	  Teller	  (1984),	  and	  is	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  Gescheider’s	  (1997)	  psychophysics	  textbooks.	  Kingdom	  and	  Prins	  (2009,	  p.18)	  choose	  not	  to	  employ	  it	  as	  an	  overarching	  basis	  for	  classifying	  psychophysical	  experiments	  because	  of	  the	  problem	  that	  certain	  tasks	  cannot	  be	  classified	  as	  either	  A	  or	  B.	  	  	  Kingdom	  and	  Prins’	  preferred	  distinction	  	  is	  between	  tasks	  that	  measure	  performance	  and	  those	  that	  measure	  appearance,	  which	  they	  characterise	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  “If	  the	  measurement	  can	  be	  meaningfully	  considered	  to	  be	  better	  under	  one	  condition	  than	  under	  another,	  then	  it	  is	  a	  performance	  measure,	  if	  not	  it	  is	  an	  appearance	  measure.”	  (p.22)	  Performance	  tasks	  are	  any	  ones	  designed	  to	  chart	  perceptual	  “limits”	  (e.g.	  contrast	  discrimination,	  detection	  of	  a	  spot	  of	  light	  against	  a	  differently	  coloured	  background).	  An	  example	  of	  an	  appearance	  task	  is	  an	  experiment	  comparing	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  Müller-­‐Lyer	  illusion	  with	  fin	  angles	  of	  45°	  and	  60°.	  Even	  if	  the	  length	  of	  the	  central	  bars	  appears	  to	  be	  more	  different	  when	  the	  fins	  are	  45°,	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  is	  “better”	  at	  the	  task	  in	  that	  condition.	  So	  this	  Class	  B	  observation	  can	  also	  be	  said	  to	  be	  an	  appearance	  measure.	  Thus	  there	  is	  an	  overlap	  with	  my	  distinction:	  appearance	  tasks	  tend	  to	  be	  introspection-­‐heavy,	  and	  performance	  tasks	  tend	  to	  be	  minimally-­‐introspective.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  as	  well	  matched	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  Class	  A	  vs.	  B.	  In	  particular,	  the	  metameric	  match	  task	  that	  I	  classify	  as	  minimally-­‐introspective	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  an	  appearance	  measure.6	  	  	  
3.	  Not	  All	  Psychophysical	  Methods	  Were	  Created	  Equal	  	  All	  I	  have	  argued	  so	  far	  is	  that	  there	  is	  an	  intuitive	  way	  of	  differentiating	  psychophysical	  tasks	  that	  are	  more	  reliant	  on	  introspection	  from	  those	  that	  are	  not,	  and	  that	  my	  categorisations	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  roughly	  co-­‐extensional	  with	  categorisations	  of	  tasks	  developed	  within	  the	  psychophysical	  tradition.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  A	  related	  dichotomy	  is	  Sperling’s	  (et	  al.	  1990)	  Type	  1	  vs.	  Type	  2	  distinction.	  In	  Type	  1	  experiments	  the	  subject’s	  response	  maybe	  either	  correct	  or	  incorrect	  with	  respect	  to	  some	  physical	  dimension	  of	  the	  stimulus	  (e.g.	  for	  either	  is	  more	  oblique	  than	  line	  2).	  For	  Type	  2	  the	  experimenter	  is	  cannot	  classify	  responses	  as	  correct	  or	  incorrect.	  Note	  again	  that	  the	  metameric	  match	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  Type	  2,	  even	  though	  Class	  A/minimally-­‐introspective.	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question	  now	  is	  what	  to	  make	  of	  this	  finding.	  Is	  it	  just	  a	  coincidence	  that	  the	  distinctions	  coincide?	  It	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  to	  the	  reader	  that	  my	  next	  point	  will	  be	  that	  the	  categories	  that	  line	  up	  on	  the	  introspection-­‐heavy	  side	  have	  tended	  to	  meet	  with	  more	  diffidence	  and	  suspicion	  from	  psychophysicists	  than	  those	  on	  the	  other	  side.	  	  	  Brindley	  (1970)	  presents	  type	  A	  observations	  as	  especially	  informative	  about	  the	  physiological	  mechanisms	  underlying	  perception	  because	  they	  can	  be	  used	  to	  test	  “psycho-­‐physical	  linking	  hypotheses”,	  that	  two	  stimuli	  (e.g.	  yellow	  monochromatic	  light,	  and	  a	  certain	  mixture	  of	  red	  and	  green	  lights)	  will	  produce	  the	  same	  neural	  activity	  and	  hence	  the	  same	  sensation.	  	  	  On	  the	  relative	  status	  of	  the	  two	  classes	  he	  writes	  that,	  	  “The	  use	  of	  Class	  A	  observations	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  analysing	  the	  function	  of	  the	  eye	  and	  visual	  pathway	  is	  not	  controversial;	  every	  writer	  on	  vision	  admits,	  at	  least	  by	  implication,	  that	  they	  can	  be	  legitimately	  used.	  On	  the	  use	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  observation	  here	  called	  Class	  B,	  there	  have	  been	  differences	  of	  opinion	  …	  The	  conservative	  opinion,	  in	  its	  most	  extreme	  form,	  is	  that	  only	  Class	  A	  observations	  are	  of	  any	  value,	  and	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  visual	  mechanisms	  all	  Class	  B	  observations	  may	  be	  entirely	  disregarded.”	  (1970,	  p.	  134)	  	  Brindley	  himself	  takes	  this	  view	  to	  be	  too	  narrow,	  but	  is	  critical	  of	  Stevens’	  (1951)	  “extreme	  liberal	  opinion”	  for	  failing	  to	  make	  the	  distinction.	  Later	  in	  the	  book,	  when	  discussing	  Hering’s	  opponent	  theory	  of	  colour	  he	  writes	  as	  if	  it	  is	  still	  moot	  whether	  the	  kinds	  of	  phenomenological	  reports	  presented	  by	  Hering	  in	  support	  of	  his	  theory	  can	  actually	  be	  taken	  as	  evidence	  for	  a	  kind	  of	  colour	  mechanism	  (p.208).	  	  One	  might	  think	  that	  this	  is	  all	  besides	  the	  point	  in	  a	  discussion	  about	  introspection	  because	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  value	  of	  Class	  B	  observations	  was	  held	  in	  question	  was	  not	  because	  they	  are	  introspection-­‐heavy,	  but	  because	  their	  failure	  to	  underwrite	  psychophysical	  bridge	  principles.	  But	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  this	  problem	  is	  so	  disconnected	  to	  from	  the	  issue	  of	  introspection.	  For	  if	  Class	  B	  tasks	  were	  to	  be	  granted	  some	  supporting	  assumptions,	  like	  the	  ones	  offered	  for	  Class	  A,	  then	  one	  could	  equally	  say	  that	  they	  are	  informative	  of	  underlying	  neural	  mechanisms.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  asymmetric	  hue	  matching	  experiment,	  why	  not	  assume	  that	  when	  the	  hue	  sensation	  for	  each	  stimulus	  is	  equal,	  that	  is	  evidence	  that	  there	  is	  a	  neural	  pathway	  somewhere	  between	  the	  photoreceptors	  and	  the	  cortex	  that	  conveys	  the	  same	  message	  in	  both	  cases?	  This	  would	  be	  a	  special	  case	  of	  the	  assumption	  made	  in	  support	  of	  inferences	  from	  Class	  A	  observations	  that,	  “whenever	  two	  stimuli	  cause	  physically	  indistinguishable	  signals	  to	  be	  sent	  from	  the	  sense	  organs	  to	  the	  brain,	  the	  sensations	  produced	  by	  these	  stimuli,	  as	  reported	  by	  the	  subject	  in	  words,	  symbols	  or	  actions,	  must	  also	  be	  indistinguishable”	  (Brindley	  1970,	  p.133).	  	  Yet,	  Class	  B	  observations	  are	  treated	  differently.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  difference	  is	  likely	  because	  Brindley	  and	  other	  theorists	  (e.g	  Marks	  1978)	  have	  been	  wary	  of	  attributing	  to	  subjects	  the	  kind	  of	  introspective	  powers	  that	  would	  be	  needed	  to	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analyse	  hue	  separately	  from	  all	  other	  sensory	  qualities,	  and	  determine	  exactly	  the	  point	  of	  equivalence	  of	  hue.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  these	  theorists	  had	  shared	  Titchener’s	  faith	  in	  the	  analytical	  acumen	  of	  introspection,	  they	  would	  have	  had	  no	  reason	  to	  treat	  Class	  B	  observations	  differently	  from	  Class	  A.	  	  	  	  This	  pattern	  of	  unequal	  treatment	  can	  be	  seen	  not	  just	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  Class	  A	  and	  B	  observations,	  but	  also	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  other	  dichotomies	  discussed	  by	  Kingdom	  and	  Prins.	  They	  note	  that	  it	  is	  fairly	  common	  for	  psychophysicists	  to	  refer	  to	  some	  tasks	  as	  more	  “objective”	  or	  “subjective”	  than	  others,	  with	  all	  the	  value-­‐laden	  connotations	  of	  these	  terms.	  Kingdom	  and	  Prins	  explain	  this	  usage	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  	  “All	  psychophysical	  experiments	  are	  in	  a	  trivial	  sense	  subjective,	  because	  they	  measure	  what	  is	  going	  on	  inside	  the	  head,	  and	  if	  this	  is	  the	  intended	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  then	  the	  distinction	  is	  redundant7.	  The	  dichotomy	  is	  more	  often	  invoked,	  however,	  to	  differentiate	  between	  different	  types	  of	  psychophysical	  procedure.	  The	  distinction	  has	  been	  used	  variously	  to	  characterize	  Class	  A	  versus	  Class	  B	  observations,	  tasks	  for	  which	  there	  is	  versus	  tasks	  for	  which	  there	  is	  not	  a	  correct	  and	  an	  incorrect	  response8,	  forced-­‐choice	  versus	  non-­‐forced-­‐choice	  procedures,	  and	  criterion-­‐dependent	  versus	  criterion-­‐free	  procedures.”	  (p.18-­‐19)	  	  The	  notion	  of	  subjectivity	  at	  play	  here	  is	  encapsulated	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  experiments	  are	  subjective	  if	  they	  are	  introspection-­‐heavy.	  For	  all	  the	  tasks	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  the	  subjective-­‐objective	  tracks	  are	  ones	  which	  rely	  on	  the	  subject’s	  judgments	  concerning	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  stimuli,	  involving	  complex	  comparisons	  which	  cannot	  be	  independently	  verified	  by	  examining	  the	  physical	  properties	  of	  the	  stimuli	  themselves.	  	  	  To	  conclude,	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  title	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  misleading.	  I	  have	  not	  showed	  that	  the	  psychophysicists	  have	  avoided	  using	  experimental	  methods	  more	  reliant	  on	  introspection,	  or	  that	  the	  use	  of	  such	  methods	  has	  always	  been	  questioned.	  Indeed,	  when	  Kingdom	  and	  Prins	  write	  that,	  “Both	  performance-­‐based	  and	  appearance-­‐based	  experiments	  are	  important	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  vision.	  Measures	  from	  both	  types	  of	  experiments	  are	  probably	  necessary	  to	  fully	  characterize	  the	  system”	  (p.26),	  	  they	  are	  articulating	  a	  methodological	  pluralism	  that	  many	  psychophysicists	  would	  endorse.	  However,	  the	  crucial	  point	  is	  that	  the	  methods	  on	  the	  wrong	  side	  of	  the	  divide,	  those	  more	  reliant	  on	  introspection,	  continue	  to	  need	  their	  advocates,	  whereas	  those	  on	  the	  other	  have	  been	  accepted	  without	  question.	  This	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  contested	  status	  of	  introspection	  within	  the	  psychophysics	  tradition.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Cf.	  the	  worry	  discussed	  above	  that	  all	  psychophysical	  experiments	  rely	  on	  introspection	  in	  a	  trivial	  or	  “minimal”	  way,	  hence	  the	  distinction	  between	  introspection	  and	  perception	  is	  made	  redundant.	  	  	  8	  I.e.	  performance	  vs.	  appearance	  or	  Sperling’s	  Type	  1	  vs.	  Type	  2.	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